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Abstract: Causal mediation analysis aims at disentangling a treatment effect into an indirect mechanism
operating through an intermediate outcome or mediator, as well as the direct effect of the treatment on
the outcome of interest. However, the evaluation of direct and indirect effects is frequently complicated
by non-ignorable selection into the treatment and/or mediator, even after controlling for observables, as
well as sample selection/outcome attrition. We propose a method for bounding direct and indirect effects
in the presence of such complications using a method that is based on a sequence of linear programming
problems. Considering inverse probability weighting by propensity scores, we compute the weights that
would yield identification in the absence of complications and perturb them by an entropy parameter
reflecting a specific amount of propensity score misspecification to set-identify the effects of interest. We
apply our method to data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 to derive bounds on
the explained and unexplained components of a gender wage gap decomposition that is likely prone to
non-ignorable mediator selection and outcome attrition.
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1 Introduction
Mediation analysis aims to decompose a treatment effect into an indirect causal mechanism op-
erating through one or several intermediate variables, so-called mediators, as well as the direct
effect,including any mechanisms not operating through the mediators of interest. For instance,
early childhood interventions might affect labor market or health outcomes later in life through
different mechanisms like the formation of cognitive or non-cognitive skills, see for instance Heck-
man, Pinto, and Savelyev (2013) and Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2015). Furthermore, job
seeker counseling may influence employment through assignment to training programs or other
mechanisms in the counseling process, see Huber, Lechner, and Mellace (2017). Even with a ran-
domly assigned treatment, direct and indirect effects are generally not identified by naively con-
trolling for mediators, as this likely introduces selection bias, see Robins and Greenland (1992).
While much of the earlier work on mediation analysis assumed linear models and/or neglected
selection issues, see Cochran (1957), Judd and Kenny (1981), and Baron and Kenny (1986), more
recent contributions discuss more general identification approaches and explicitly consider con-
founding. See for instance Robins and Greenland (1992), Pearl (2001), Robins (2003), Petersen,
Sinisi, and van der Laan (2006), VanderWeele (2009), Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010), Hong
(2010), Albert and Nelson (2011), Imai and Yamamoto (2013), Tchetgen Tchetgen and Shpitser
(2012), and Vansteelandt, Bekaert, and Lange (2012).
In most mediation studies, identification relies on a conditionally exogenous treatment and
mediator given observed covariates and rules out non-ignorable outcome attrition or sample
selection, i.e. that outcomes are only observed for a nonrandom subpopulation. This issue
occurs for instance in wage regressions, where wages are only observed for the selective subgroup
of employed individuals, see Heckman (1976) and Heckman (1979). For this reason, Huber and
Solovyeva (2018a) incorporate outcome attrition into mediation models, assuming conditional
treatment and mediator exogeneity and tackling outcome attrition either by observed covariates
(missing at random assumption, see e.g. Rubin (1976) and Little and Rubin (1987)) or by
instruments (if attrition is selective in unobservables). In many empirical problems, however,
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observed covariates might not be rich enough to convincingly control for treatment/mediator
endogeneity and attrition bias while instruments that satisfy specific exclusion restrictions
w.r.t. attrition (see for instance Das, Newey, and Vella (2003) and Huber (2014)) might not be
available.
This paper provides a method for deriving bounds on direct and indirect effects when the
treatment, the mediator and outcome attrition are likely selective even after controlling for
observed covariates. Considering identification based on inverse probability weighting based on
a combination of propensity scores, we compute the weights that would yield identification in
the absence of complications (as provided in Huber and Solovyeva (2018a)) and perturb them by
an entropy parameter reflecting misspecification in the various propensity scores. Based on the
framing the identification issue as an optimization problem to be solved by linear programming,
we set-identify the mean potential outcomes and thus, the direct and indirect effects of interest.
Our contribution is related to further studies that used optimization, and in particular linear
programming, to derive bounds on treatment effects under selection problems, see e.g. Balke
and Pearl (1997), Manski (2007), Honore´ and Tamer (2006), Molinari (2008), Freyberger and
Horowitz (2015), Laffe´rs and Jr (2017), Laffe´rs (2019), among many others. Our paper is also
related to the literature on sensitivity analysis in mediation analysis. VanderWeele (2010), for
instance, provides a general formula for the bias of direct and indirect effects in the presence
of an unobserved mediator-outcome confounder. By considering sensible values for differences
in conditional mean outcomes across confounder values and for differences in the conditional
mean of the confounder across treatment states, researches may investigate the sensitivity of
the effects. Imai, Keele, and Yamamoto (2010) propose a sensitivity check for parametric (both
linear and nonlinear) mediation models based on specifying the correlation of unobserved terms
in the mediation and outcome equations, assuming that the mediator-outcome confounders are
not a function of the treatment. In contrast, Tchetgen Tchetgen and Shpitser (2012) suggest a
semiparametric procedure that allows for confounders of the mediator-outcome relation which are
affected by the treatment based on specifying and calibrating the so-called selection bias function,
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which is agnostic about the dimension of unobserved confounders. See VanderWeele and Chiba
(2014) and Vansteelandt and VanderWeele (2012) for further selection bias functions.
As an alternative strategy, Albert and Nelson (2011) suggest considering the correlation of
counterfactual values of post-treatment variables as sensitivity parameter. Finally, the paper that
is the closest to our approach is Hong, Qin, and Yang (2018), which provides a method tailored to
weighting estimators under the omission of both pre- and post-treatment confounders. The idea
is that such confounders create a discrepancy between the correct weight an observation should
obtain and the one actually used. The resulting bias can be represented by the covariance between
the weight discrepancy and the outcome conditional on the treatment, which serves as base for
conducting sensitivity analyses. Our approach is different to Hong, Qin, and Yang (2018) in that
we represent the discrepancy between the correct and observed weights using entropy parameters
and, instead of deriving analytical formulas, rely on an optimization routine to obtain bounds on
direct and indirect effects. This allows for a separate relaxation of the three main identification
assumptions and thus may lead to a better understanding of the non-robustness of the results
to violations of the various identification assumptions. We also note that the econometric setup
of Huber and Solovyeva (2018a) underlying our analysis invokes a different set of assumptions
than Hong, Qin, and Yang (2018) or any of the other previous methods, such that our approach
permits investigating sensitivity also w.r.t. outcome attrition.1
We apply our method to data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, a panel
study of young individuals in the U.S. aged 14 to 22 years in 1979. The specific sample considered
has previously been analyzed by Huber and Solovyeva (2018b) to decompose the gender gap in
wages reported in the year 2000 into an indirect (or explained) component due to differences in
mediators like education and occupation, as well as a direct (or unexplained) gender difference in
wages not attributable to the observed mediators. While Huber and Solovyeva (2018b) investi-
1The studies mentioned and our own investigate the sensitivity of direct and indirect effects to prespecified
deviations from the identifying assumptions. Alternatively, one may derive worst case bounds, which are based on
the possibly most extreme forms of violations of specific assumptions, which typically implies a rather wide range
of admissible effect values. See for instance Kaufman, Kaufman, MacLenose, Greenland, and Poole (2005), Cai,
Kuroki, Pearl, and Tian (2008), Sjo¨lander (2009), and Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2010).
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gated the sensitivity of point estimation of explained and unexplained component under different
identifying assumptions, our approach permits easing any of the conditional exogeneity assump-
tions on gender, the mediators, and selection into employment (as wages are only observed for
working individuals) to derive bound son the parameters of interest. We find that the omission of
confounders of the treatment and the mediators would potentially have the largest impact on the
significance of the results. More specifically, the omission of a confounder that has the same pre-
dictive power as the first or second most important mediator entering the treatment propensity
score would render all the effects insignificant. The results also show that in some specifications
the choice of the link function in the estimation of probabilistic weights matter.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the variables as
well as the direct and indirect effects of interest. Section 3 restates the identifying assumptions
of Huber and Solovyeva (2018a), under which the direct and indirect effects are point identified,
and introduces the sensitivity analysis based on inverse probability weighting when relaxing these
assumptions. Section 4 presents an application to the decomposition of the U.S. gender wage gap
using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. Section 5 concludes.
2 Variables and parameters of interest
Mediation analysis typically aims to disentangle the average treatment effect (ATE) of a binary
treatment, denoted by D, on an outcome variable, denoted by Y , into a direct effect and an
indirect effect operating through one or several mediators. We denote the latter by M , which is
assumed to have bounded support and may be scalar or a vector of variables and contain discrete
and/or continuous elements. For defining natural direct and indirect effects, we make use of the
potential outcome framework, see for instance Rubin (1974), which has been applied to causal
mediation analysis for instance by Ten Have, Joffe, Lynch, Brown, Maisto, and Beck (2007) and
Albert (2008). Let to this endM(d), Y (d,M(d′)) denote the potential mediator state as a function
of the treatment and potential outcome as a function of the treatment and the potential mediator,
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respectively, under treatments d, d′ ∈ {0, 1}. For each subject, only one potential outcome and
mediator state, respectively, is observed, because the realized mediator and outcome values are
M = D ·M(1) + (1−D) ·M(0) and Y = D · Y (1,M(1)) + (1−D) · Y (0,M(0)).
The ATE, denoted by ∆, is given by the total effect of the treatment operating through the
direct or indirect mechanisms:
∆ = E[Y (1,M(1)) − Y (0,M(0))]. (1)
The (average) direct effect, denoted by θ(d), is characterized by the difference in mean potential
outcomes under treatment and non-treatment when fixing the mediator at its potential value for
D = d, which shuts down the indirect mechanism via M .
θ(d) = E[Y (1,M(d)) − Y (0,M(d))], d ∈ {0, 1}. (2)
The (average) indirect effect, denoted by δ(d), is given by the difference in mean potential out-
comes when exogenously varying the mediator to take its potential values under treatment and
non-treatment, but keeping the treatment fixed at D = d to shut down the direct effect.
δ(d) = E[Y (d,M(1)) − Y (d,M(0))], d ∈ {0, 1}. (3)
Robins and Greenland (1992) and Robins (2003) referred to these causal parameters as
pure/total direct and indirect effects, Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2009) as net and mechanism
average treatment effects, and Pearl (2001) as natural direct and indirect effects, which is the
denomination followed in the remained of this study.
The ATE is the sum of the natural direct and indirect effects defined upon opposite treatment
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states:
∆ = E[Y (1,M(1)) − Y (0,M(0))]
= E[Y (1,M(1)) − Y (0,M(1))] + E[Y (0,M(1)) − Y (0,M(0))] = θ(1) + δ(0)
= E[Y (1,M(0)) − Y (0,M(0))] + E[Y (1,M(1)) − Y (1,M(0))] = θ(0) + δ(1). (4)
This follows from adding and subtracting either E[Y (0,M(1))] or E[Y (1,M(0))] in (4).The no-
tation θ(1), θ(0) and δ(1), δ(0) allows for effect heterogeneity as a function of the treatment state,
i.e., the presence of interaction effects between the treatment and the mediator. For instance, the
impact of a training (M) on employment (Y ) might depend on whether a job seeker has received
some form of counseling in the job search process (D). A different way to see this is that the
direct effect of counseling (D) may depend on whether the job seeker attends a training (M).
Obviously, effects are not identified without invoking identifying assumptions. First,
Y (1,M(1)) and Y (0,M(0)) are not observed for any subject at the same time, which constitutes
the fundamental problem of causal inference. Second, neither Y (1,M(0)), nor Y (0,M(1)) is
observed for any subject. Therefore, point identification of direct and indirect effects requires
the treatment and the mediator to be exogenous at least conditional on observables, which
appears, however, implausible in many empirical applications. Our sensitivity analysis outlined
in Section 3 relaxes such exogeneity conditions at the cost of giving up on point identification.
This permits incorporating a vector of observed pre-treatment covariates, denoted by X, that
may confound the causal relations between D and M , D and Y , and M and Y . It is thus
assumed that X is insufficient to control for all sources of selection such that unobserved
confounders render point identification of direct and indirect effects impossible, which appears
plausible in many empirical contexts.
As a further complication to identification, our framework allows for considering outcome
attrition/sample selection, implying that Y is only observed for a non-random subpopulation. For
instance, when investigating wage outcomes, as in Gronau (1974), the subpopulation of employed
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individuals for whom wages are observed might be positively selected in terms of unobservables
like ability and motivation. As a further example, consider the effect of educational interventions
on test scores, with scores being only observed for those participating in the test or reporting
the results, see Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006). We therefore introduce a binary selection
indicator S, which indicates whether Y is observed for a specific subject. While S is allowed to
be a function of D, M , and X, i.e. S = S(D,M,X), it is assumed to neither be affected by nor
to affect outcome Y . S is therefore not a mediator, as selection per se does not causally influence
the outcome, but might nevertheless create endogeneity bias when outcomes are only observed
conditional on S = 1.
3 Sensitivity analysis
The starting point for our sensitivity analysis is a set of assumptions provided in Huber and
Solovyeva (2018a), which identifies direct and indirect effects by invoking conditional treatment
and mediator exogeneity as well outcome attrition related to observed characteristics (known as
missing at random assumption). Formally, the assumptions are as follows:
Assumption A1 (conditional independence of the treatment):
(a) Y (d,m)⊥D|X = x, (b) M(d′)⊥D|X = x for all d, d′ ∈ {0, 1} and m,x in the support of
M,X.
Assumption A1 rules out unobservables jointly affecting the treatment on the one hand and the
mediator and/or the outcome on the other hand conditional on X. In contrast, our sensitivity
analysis permits that such unobserved confounders do exist.
Assumption A2 (conditional independence of the mediator):
Y (d,m)⊥M |D = d′,X = x for all d, d′ ∈ {0, 1} and m,x in the support of M,X.
Assumption A2 rules out unobservables jointly affecting the mediator and the outcome conditional
on D and X. This only appears plausible if detailed information on possible confounders of the
mediator-outcome relation is available in the data (even in experiments with random treatment
7
assignment) and if post-treatment confounders of M and Y can be plausibly ruled out when
controlling for D and X. In contrast, our sensitivity analysis allows for unobserved confounders
of the mediator-outcome relation.
Assumption A3 (conditional independence of selection):
Y⊥S|D = d,M = m,X = x for all d ∈ {0, 1} and m,x in the support of M,X.
Assumption A3 rules out unobservables jointly affecting selection and the outcome conditional
on D,M,X, such that outcomes are missing at random (MAR) in the denomination of Rubin
(1976), i.e. outcome attrition is selective w.r.t. observed characteristics only. In contrast, our
sensitivity analysis permits outcome attrition to be selective w.r.t. unobservables.
Assumption A4 (common support):
(a) Pr(D = d|M = m,X = x) > 0 and (b) Pr(S = 1|D = d,M = m,X = x) > 0 for all d ∈ {0, 1}
and m,x in the support of M,X.
Assumption A4 consists of two common support restrictions. The first requires the conditional
probability to receive a specific treatment given M,X, henceforth referred to as propensity score,
to be larger than zero for either treatment state. This also implies that Pr(D = d|X = x) > 0
and (by Bayes’ theorem) that Pr(M = m|D = d,X = x) > 0, or in the case of M being
continuous, that the conditional density of M given D,X is larger than zero. Therefore, M must
not be deterministic in D given X, as otherwise identification fails due to the lack of comparable
units in terms of the mediator across treatment states. The second common support restriction
requires that for any combination of D,M,X, the probability to be observed is larger than zero.
Otherwise, the outcome is not observed for some specific combinations of these variables. Our
sensitivity relies on the same set of common support assumptions, in order to make treated and
non-treated subjects with observed and non-observed outcomes comparable in terms of observed
characteristics.
As outlined in Theorem 1 of Huber and Solovyeva (2018a), Assumptions A1 to A4 permit
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identifying the mean potential outcomes based on inverse probability weighting (IPW) by
E[Y (1,M(1))] = E
[
Y ·D · S · 1
Pr(D = 1|X) ·
1
Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
, (5)
E[Y (0,M(0))] = E
[
Y · (1−D) · S · 1
1− Pr(D = 1|X) ·
1
Pr(S = 1|D,M,X)
]
,
E[Y (1,M(0))] = E
[
Y ·D · S · 1
1− Pr(D = 1|X) ·
1
Pr(S = 1|D,M,X) ·
(
1
Pr(D = 1|M,X) − 1
)]
,
E[Y (0,M(1))] = E
[
Y · (1−D) · S · 1
Pr(D = 1|X) ·
1
Pr(S = 1|D,M,X) ·
(
1
1− Pr(D = 1|M,X) − 1
)]
.
The direct and indirect effects of interest are obtained as differences between two out of the four
mean potential outcomes. For notational ease, we henceforth denote the various propensity scores
in (5) by
pA1 = Pr(D = 1|X), pA2 = Pr(D = 1|M,X), pA3 = Pr(S = 1|D,M,X). (6)
This denomination is motivated by the fact that e.g. under A3, there are no confounders that
jointly affect S and D conditional on (M,X), S and M conditional on (D,X) or S and X
conditional on (M,D). So under A3, pA3 is the correct probability to be used for weighting in
order to obtain mean potential outcomes. Conversely, if A3 does not hold, e.g. some important
confounder is missing, then the correct weight differs from pA3.
Figure 1 illustrates our mediation framework with outcome attrition based on a directed
acyclic graph, in which the arrows represent causal effects. It is worth noting that each of D, M ,
S, X, and Y might be causally affected by further, unobserved variables not displayed in Figure
1. As long as such unobservables do not jointly affect D and Y , D and M , M and Y , or S and
Y conditional on X, Assumptions A1 to A3 hold. In many empirical problems, however, some
or all of A1 to A3 appear difficult defend. While, for instance, A1 holds by design in randomized
experiments, it may appear less plausible in observational studies, in particular if the set of
observed control variables is limited. Assumption A2 might seem unlikely in any identification
design, in particular if there is a substantial time lag between D and M which makes mediator-
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Figure 1: Causal paths under conditional exogeneity and missing at random given pre-treatment
covariates
D
M
X
Y
S
outcome confounding more likely even when conditioning on pre-treatment covariates X. We
therefore consider various relaxations of Assumptions A1 to A3.
Our approach modifies the IPW weights of the expressions in (5) to investigate sensitivity and
is thus related to Hong, Qin, and Yang (2018), who were the first to propose robustness checks
in the context of IPW. However, our approach uses a different measure of discrepancies between
the correct and observed weights than Hong, Qin, and Yang (2018), whose sensitivity check is
based on the covariance between the weight discrepancy and the outcome conditional on the
treatment. Also, our approach does not entail analytical formulae and thus relies on optimization
routines. Even though this increases the computational burden, an advantage is that we are able
to separately consider relaxations of the various identifying assumptions and thus gain insights
on the sources of the potential non-robustness of the effects.
To see the intuition of our approach, suppose for the moment that there exist a scalar of a
vector of unobserved confounders, denoted by U , that makes Assumption A3 fail. In this case,
pA3 is no longer the appropriate propensity score for identifying the mean potential outcomes.
Our sensitivity analysis is based on specifying the magnitude by which pA3 may deviate from the
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appropriate (but unidentified) propensity score that includes U as conditioning variable. More
formally, we consider the following entropy measure defined as the absolute difference between
pA3 and the appropriate propensity score for identification, qA3 = Pr(S = 1|D,M,X,U):
|qA3 − pA3| ≤ ǫA3
√
pA3(1− pA3). (7)
This definition restricts the absolute error in the propensity score pA3 due to omitting confounders
U to a multiple ǫA3 of the standard deviation of a random variable with a binomial distribution
corresponding to that of pA3. This definition also satisfies a symmetry property, so that the
relaxation of the identifying assumption leads to the same set of values for pA3 and for (1− pA3).
The crucial task is to sensibly choose the value of ǫA3, e.g. based on the richness of X, which
determines the likely importance of omitted confounders U . In an analogous way, qA1 = Pr(D =
1|X,U), qA2 = Pr(D = 1|M,X,U) as well as ǫA1 and ǫA2 are to be defined. Suppose there were no
unobserved confounders and that Assumptions A1, A2, A3 were satisfied. That would correspond
to the situation with ǫA1 = ǫA3 = ǫA3 = 0. The greater is the particular entropy parameter, the
larger is the permitted importance of unobserved confounders in the specific assumption.
Our sensitivity analysis provides bounds on estimates of the mean potential outcomes in (5)
for deviations of A1, A2, A3 when obeying the restrictions given by ǫA1, ǫA2, and ǫA3 in (7) as
well as specific scaling constraints. The bounds on mean potential outcomes then translate into
bounds on natural direct and indirect effects. Assume that we have available an i.i.d. sample of
(Yi,Di,Mi,Xi, Si) for n subjects, where i ∈ {1, 2, ...., n} indexes a specific observation. For the
sake of exposition, consider the estimation of E[Y (1,M(1))]. Under Assumptions A1, A3, and
A4, this quantity can be estimated by
Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))] =
1
c
·
n∑
i=1
Yi ·Di · Si · 1
pˆA1i
· 1
pˆA3i
,
where pˆA1i , pˆ
A3
i denote estimates of p
A1, pA3 for observation i, which we obtain in our applica-
tion presented below by logit regression, and c denotes a normalizing constant, c =
∑n
i=1
Di
pˆA1i
·
11
Si
pˆA3i
.2 In the presence of confounders U and a failure of assumptions A1 and/or A3, estimating
Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))] based on pˆA1i , pˆ
A3
i is generally inconsistent. To estimate the bounds on the mean
potential outcome under such violations, the unknown population parameters pA1 and pA3 are
replaced by their estimates pˆA1i and pˆ
A3
i in (7) to estimate the entropy measures |qA1 − pA1| and
|qA3 − pA3|, respectively.
Finding the bounds on Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))] corresponds to solving the following optimization prob-
lem:
min /max
qA1,qA3
1
c
·
n∑
i=1
Yi ·Di · Si · 1
qA1i
· 1
qA3i
(8)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
Di · Si
qA1i
=
n∑
i=1
Di · Si
pˆA1i
,
n∑
i=1
Di · Si
qA3i
=
n∑
i=1
Di · Si
pˆA3i
,
n∑
i=1
Di
qA1i
Si
qA3i
=
n∑
i=1
Di
pˆA1i
Si
pˆA3i
= c,(9)
∀i : |qA1i − pˆA1i | ≤ ǫA1,1
√
pˆA1i (1− pˆA1i ), |qA3i − pˆA3i | ≤ ǫA3,1
√
pˆA3i (1− pˆA3i ), (10)
qA1i ∈ [0, 1], qA3i ∈ [0, 1]. (11)
The equalities in (9) are normalizing restrictions, while the expressions in (10) relax the identi-
fying assumptions and (11) ensures that qi are proper probabilities. We note that as only those
observations i with Di = 1 and Si = 1 enter the calculations, we added a superscript 1 to the
entropy parameters ǫ (for Di = 1). This implies that one might pick different parameters for
different treatment groups, if e.g. justified by contextual knowledge.
The optimization problem (8) may be transformed into a computationally more convenient
2Note that Assumption A2 is not required for the identification of E[Y (d,M(d))] for d ∈ {0, 1}, but for
E[Y (d,M(1− d))].
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form. Let to this end ωA1i = 1/q
A1
i and ω
A3
i = 1/q
A3
i . Then, an alternative representation is
min /max
ωA1,ωA3
1
c
·
n∑
i=1
Yi ·Di · Si · ωA1i · ωA3i (12)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
Di · Si · ωA1i =
n∑
i=1
Di · Si
pˆA1i
,
n∑
i=1
Di · Si · ωA3i =
n∑
i=1
Di · Si
pˆA3i
,
n∑
i=1
Di · Si · ωA1i · ωA3i =
n∑
i=1
Di
pˆA1i
Si
pˆA3i
= c,
∀i : ωA1i ≤ 1/
(
pˆA1i − ǫA1,1
√
pˆA1i (1− pˆA1i )
)
, ωA1i ≥ 1/
(
pˆA1i + ǫ
A1,1
√
pˆA1i (1− pˆA1i )
)
,
ωA3i ≤ 1/
(
pˆA3i − ǫA3,1
√
pˆA3i (1− pˆA3i )
)
, ωA3i ≥ 1/
(
pˆA3i + ǫ
A3,1
√
pˆA3i (1− pˆA3i )
)
,
ωA1i ≥ 0, ωA3i ≥ 0.
For a fixed vector ωA1 or ωA3, this problem is a linear program. This suggests an algorithm
that iteratively changes ωA1 and ωA2 until convergence using ωA1i = 1/pˆ
A1
i and ω
A3
i = 1/pˆ
A3
i as
starting point. An important feature of our approach based on the optimization is that we impose
no structure on the dependence of potentially omitted confounders and our outcome variable and
exhaust all possibilities for the weights. This may in general lead to wider bounds and thus more
prudent inference.
Bounds on Eˆ[Y (0,M(0))] (i.e. the estimate of E[Y (0,M(0))]) can be constructed in an analo-
gous manner by using observations with Si = 1, Di = 0 and searching through (1− qA1i ) instead.
For bounds on Eˆ[Y (1,M(0))] and Eˆ[Y (0,M(1))], one has to optimize w.r.t. qA1i , q
A2
i and q
A3
i .
All optimization problems are formally stated in Appendix A. After deriving upper and lower
bounds on the mean potential outcomes, we may construct bounds on the effects of interest in
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the following way:
∆ˆLB = Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))]LB − Eˆ[Y (0,M(0))]UB ,
∆ˆUB = Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))]UB − Eˆ[Y (0,M(0))]LB ,
θˆ(1)LB = Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))]LB − Eˆ[Y (0,M(1))]UB ,
θˆ(1)UB = Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))]UB − Eˆ[Y (0,M(1))]LB ,
θˆ(0)LB = Eˆ[Y (1,M(0))]LB − Eˆ[Y (0,M(0))]UB ,
θˆ(0)UB = Eˆ[Y (1,M(0))]UB − Eˆ[Y (0,M(0))]LB ,
δˆ(1)LB = Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))]LB − Eˆ[Y (1,M(0))]UB ,
δˆ(1)UB = Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))]UB − Eˆ[Y (1,M(0))]LB ,
δˆ(0)LB = Eˆ[Y (0,M(1))]LB − Eˆ[Y (0,M(0))]UB ,
δˆ(0)UB = Eˆ[Y (0,M(1))]UB − Eˆ[Y (0,M(0))]LB ,
where subscripts LB,UB stand for the lower and upper bounds of the respective estimated
mean potential outcome and ‘ˆ ’ implies that any of the causal effects are estimates rather than
population parameters. The bounds on ∆, θ(1), and θ(0) are sharp, because the observations
that are used for calculating the two mean potential outcomes upon which the respective effect
is defined are distinct. Consider for instance the lower bound on θ(1). In order to estimate
E[Y (1,M(1))]LB , we use observations with Di = 1, while for E[Y (0,M(1))]UB we only use
observations with Di = 0. In contrast, the bounds for δ(1) and δ(0) are not necessarily sharp.
As an example, consider δ(1). In order to estimate E[Y (1,M(1))]LB and E[Y (1,M(0))]UB , we
use observations with Di = 1 and the weights that entail E[Y (1,M(1))]LB and E[Y (1,M(0))]UB
are not necessary the same.3
An important question yet to be discussed is how to set the entropy parameters, which
represent changes in the propensity scores due to omitting confounders (e.g. ǫA1,1 and ǫA3,1),
3It is in principle possible to compute sharp bounds even for δ(1) and δ(0) at the cost of solving a more complex
optimization problem. In such case, however, our heuristic algorithm of solving sequential linear programs cannot
be used.
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in a meaningful way. Investigating the importance of observed confounders X may provide some
guidance for finding sensible values for the entropy parameters. Consider, for instance, a logistic
regression for estimating pA3i :
Si ∼ Bern(pA3i ),
log
(
pA3i
1− pA3i
)
= α0 + αDDi + α
T
MMi + α
T
XXi,
where pˆA3i is obtained by maximum likelihood estimation. Now consider removing the most
important predictor (of S) in X and re-estimating the propensity score, denoted as pˆA3i,X1, where
X1 are the remaining covariates (without the most important predictor).
For each observation, one can then compute the entropy parameter when including and ex-
cluding the most important predictor in X, ǫA3i,X1 =
|pˆA3i,X1−pˆ
A3
i |√
pˆA3i (1−pˆ
A3
i )
. One may ultimately pick the
entropy parameter as average of ǫA3i,X1 in the subpopulation with Di = 1 and Si = 1:
ǫA3,1X1 =
n∑
i=1
Di · Si · ǫA3i,X1∑n
i=1Di · Si
.
This corresponds to the average change induced by omitting the most important predictor from
X, which is used as a proxy for the importance of unobserved confounders U . There are different
ways of measuring the importance of a predictor in a regression and natural choice seems to be
the change in the deviance. The latter is the log-likelihood ratio statistic for testing the differ-
ence in the model fit when including and excluding a specific predictor, which is asymptotically
chi-squared distributed. Similarly ǫA3Xj and ǫ
A3
Mj would denote the average change in estimated
probabilities that would omitting the j-th most important (measured the by deviance) from X
and M , respectively.4
4Another approach for setting the entropy parameter is to consider the change in estimated probabilities
induced by a change of the link function, e.g. by picking the probit instead of logit function. Formally,
ǫA3,1i,probit =
|pˆA3i,probit−pˆ
A3
i |√
pˆA3
i
(1−pˆA3
i
)
, where pˆA3i,probit and pˆ
A3
i correspond to the estimated probabilites under a probit and
logit model, respectively. One may thus pick the entropy parameter as average ǫA3,1probit =
∑n
i=1
Di·Si·ǫ
A3
i,probit∑
n
i=1
Di·Si
.
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4 Application
We apply our method to data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79),
a panel survey of young individuals who were aged 14 to 22 years in 1979, to decompose the
gender wage gap in the year 2000 when respondents were 35 to 43 years old.5 We use exactly the
same sample definition as in Huber and Solovyeva (2018a), who consider five wage decomposition
techniques with distinct identifying assumptions to investigate the sensitivity of point estimators
of the indirect effect (or explained component) due to gender differences in mediators like edu-
cation or occupation as well as the direct gender effect (or unexplained component). However,
the consistency of these decomposition techniques relies on specific conditional exogeneity or in-
strumental variable assumptions w.r.t. to gender, the mediators, and the observability of wages,
which are likely violated in practice. See also Huber (2015) for a discussion of identification issues
with in wage decompositions based on the causal mediation framework. In contrast, the approach
suggested in this paper permits investigating the robustness of the direct and indirect effects of
gender on wage under violations of conditional exogeneity.
The NLSY79 includes a rich set of individual characteristics, including socio-economic vari-
ables likes education, occupation, work experience, and a range of further labor market-relevant
information. Our evaluation sample consists of 6,658 individuals (3,162 men and 3,496 women),
after excluding 1,351 observations from the total NLSY79 sample in 2000 due to various data
issues outlined in Huber and Solovyeva (2018a).6 Treatment D is a binary indicator for gender,
taking the value zero for females and one for males. Outcome Y corresponds to the log aver-
age hourly wage in the past calendar year reported in 2000. However, the wage outcome under
full-time employment is not observed for everyone, as a non-negligible share (in particular among
5The NLSY79 data consists of three independent samples: a cross-sectional sample (6,111 subjects, or 48%)
representing the non-institutionalized civilian youth; a supplemental sample (42%) oversampling civilian Hispanic,
black, and economically disadvantaged nonblack/non-Hispanic young people; and a military sample (10%) com-
prised of youth serving in the military as of September 30, 1978 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of
Labor (2001)).
6For instance, we excluded 502 persons reporting to work 1,000 hours or more in the past calendar year, but
whose average hourly wages in the past calendar year were either missing or equal to zero. Furthermore, we dropped
54 working individuals with average hourly wages of less than $1 in the past calendar year. We also excluded 608
observations with missing values in the mediators.
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females) are in minor employment or not employed at all. This likely introduces sample selection
issues, see Heckman (1979). We therefore define the selection indicator S to be one for individu-
als who indicated to have worked at least 1,000 hours in the past calendar year, as it is the case
for 87% of males and 70% of females.
The vector of mediators M includes individual variables reported in or constructed with
reference to 1998 such that they arguably reflect decisions taken after birth and prior to the
measurement of the outcome (i.e. on the causal path between D and Y ): marital status, years in
marriage, the region and the number of years residing in that region, a dummy for living in an
urban area (SMSA) and the number of years living in an urban area, education, dummies for the
year of first employment, number of jobs ever had, tenure with the current employer (in weeks),
industry and the number of years working in that industry, occupation and the number of years
working in that occupation, whether employed in 1998 and total years of employment, a dummy
for full-time employment and the share of full-time employment from 1994-98, total weeks of
employment, the number of weeks unemployed and the number of weeks out of the labor force,
and whether health problems prevented employment along with the history of health problems.
In the propensity scores, we control for a set of observed covariates X arguably mostly deter-
mined at or prior to birth, namely race, religion, year of birth, birth order, parental place of birth
(in the U.S. or abroad), and parental education. However, unobserved confounders causing non-
ignorable selection into the treatment, mediators, and/or employment decision S even after con-
trolling for X likely exist. For instance, risk preferences, attitudes towards competition and nego-
tiations, and other socio-psychological factors, see e.g., Bertrand (2011) and Azmat and Petron-
golo (2014), are not available in our data. Such variables might possibly confound the mediator-
outcome relationship. As a second example, selection into employment might be driven by in-
nate ability or motivation, which likely also affect wages. Due to such endogeneity concerns, one
should be cautious about deriving causal claims (e.g. about the amount of labor market discrim-
ination) and policy recommendations based on wage gap decompositions, see the discussion in
Huber and Solovyeva (2018a). In this context, our method is useful for assessing the sensitivity of
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the results to violations of some or all exogeneity conditions required for a causal interpretation
of wage decompositions.
Table 6 in Appendix B provides descriptive statistics for the key variables of our analysis,
namely means, mean differences across gender, and the respective p-values based on two-sample
t-tests. The p-values suggest that females an males differ importantly in a range of variables
like labor market experience, education, industry, and occupation. Our sensitivity analysis is
based on assuming that omitted confounders in the various propensity score specifications behave
similar to the first, second, or third important predictors among the pre-treatment covariates or
mediators that enter the respective specification. For this reason, Table 1 shows the three most
important covariates and mediators in the different propensity score models presumably prone to
confounding, where importance refers to the change in deviance as discussed at the end of Section
3.
Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 present the estimated effect bounds on θ(1), θ(0), δ(1), and δ(0), respec-
tively, in squared brackets, when basing the entropy parameter on the respective first, second,
or third most important predictors.7 95% confidence intervals are also reported in parentheses,
based on subsampling with 500 replications and a subsample size of
⌊
n0.7
⌋
.8We observe that the
direct effects remain statistically significant at the 5% level under most relaxations and that po-
tentially missing confounders would have the biggest impact via Assumption A2. Previous em-
ployment has considerable explanatory power for later labor market performance, as reflected in
the relatively wide bounds in the column for the 2nd most important missing M (employment in
1998) in Table 2, where the lower 95% confidence bound goes below zero. Table 3 displays the
estimated bounds for the natural direct effect for d = 0, when mediators are set to their potential
values for women and the indirect mechanisms are shut down. For this effect, the choice of the
link function seems important when considering Assumption A2 and the related regression for
7We note that in the decomposition literature, it is frequently the male wages that are considered as reference
(or ‘fair’) wages. This suggests considering θ(0) and δ(1) as unexplained and explained components, respectively.
See Sloczynski (2013) for an in-depth discussion of reference group choice in the potential outcome framework.
8We applied subsampling to the upper and lower bounds separately similar to Laffe´rs and Jr (2017) or Demuynck
(2015). A computationally more expensive stepdown procedure of Romano and Shaikh (2010) may be used to
control for the asymptotic coverage of the whole identified set.
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estimating P (D = 1|M,X). More precisely, if we would allow the difference between the correct
and estimated weights to be of a similar magnitude as is the difference from using the probit
instead of logit link function, then the upper bound on this effect may exceed 0.6.
Concerning the natural indirect effects reported in Tables 4 and 5, the confidence interval on
the effect estimate of 0.053 includes the zero under most relaxations for males (d = 1), while
the lower confidence bound remains above zero under most relaxations for females (d = 0). We
also observe that confidence intervals are not necessarily symmetric around the estimated bounds
and that the omission of the variable with the most predictive power (measured by the change in
deviance) does not necessarily lead to the widest bounds. The latter is due to the fact that e.g. the
strongest predictor of the treatment is not necessarily the strongest confounder, i.e. the predictor’s
association with the outcome is sufficiently weaker than that of other treatment predictors.
Table 1: Covariates and mediators with the highest predictive power
Assumption A1 P (D = 1|X)
Most important X 1st Mothers educ. missing
2nd Mothers educ. high school graduate
3rd Religion missing
Assumption A2 P (D = 1|M,X)
Most important M 1st Farmer or laborer
2nd Industry: Professional services
3rd Clerical occupation
Most important X 1st White
2nd Fathers educ. college/more
3rd Mothers educ. missing
Assumption A3 P (S = 1|D,M,X)
Most important M 1st Employed full time
2nd Employment status: employed
3rd Operator (machines, transport)
Most important X 1st Fathers educ. college/more
2nd Mothers educ. some college
3rd Protestant
Note: Most important predictors in different propensity score estimations measured by the change in deviance.
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Table 2: Bounds on the natural direct effect under d = 1 (point estimate: 0.201)
Importance
Missing X
Probit
1st 2nd 3rd
A1
[ 0.192 0.210 ] [ 0.184 0.217 ] [ 0.197 0.205 ] [ 0.201 0.201 )
( 0.105 0.303 ) ( 0.098 0.310 ) ( 0.110 0.298 ) ( 0.114 0.294 )
A2
[ 0.165 0.237 ] [ 0.166 0.235 ] [ 0.181 0.220 ] [ 0.177 0.291 ]
( 0.080 0.327 ) ( 0.081 0.325 ) ( 0.095 0.311 ) ( 0.091 0.381 )
A3
[ 0.190 0.211 ] [ 0.192 0.209 ] [ 0.192 0.209 [ 0.191 0.241 ]
( 0.104 0.305 ) ( 0.106 0.303 ) ( 0.106 0.302 ) ( 0.104 0.339 )
A1 + A2
[ 0.156 0.246 ] [ 0.150 0.252 ] [ 0.177 0.224 ] [ 0.114 0.291 ]
( 0.071 0.336 ) ( 0.065 0.342 ) ( 0.091 0.315 ) ( 0.034 0.381 )
A2 + A3
[ 0.154 0.248 ] [ 0.158 0.244 ] [ 0.173 0.229 ] [ 0.167 0.332 ]
( 0.069 0.338 ) ( 0.073 0.335 ) ( 0.087 0.320 ) ( 0.081 0.426 )
A1 + A3
[ 0.196 0.205 ] [ 0.197 0.205 ] [ 0.197 0.204 ] [ 0.188 0.213 ]
( 0.111 0.298 ) ( 0.111 0.298 ) ( 0.111 0.298 ) ( 0.112 0.305 )
A1 + A2 + A3
[ 0.145 0.257 ] [ 0.142 0.260 ] [ 0.169 0.233 ] [ 0.075 0.332 ]
( 0.060 0.348 ) ( 0.057 0.352 ) ( 0.083 0.324 ) ( -0.006 0.426 )
Importance
Missing M
1st 2nd 3rd
A2
[ 0.114 0.237 ] [ 0.068 0.235 ] [ 0.082 0.220 ]
( 0.034 0.327 ) ( -0.016 0.325 ) ( 0.003 0.311 )
A3
[ 0.162 0.211 ] [ 0.172 0.209 ] [ 0.181 0.209 ]
( 0.080 0.305 ) ( 0.086 0.303 ) ( 0.095 0.302 )
A2 + A3
[ 0.075 0.248 ] [ 0.039 0.244 ] [ 0.063 0.229 ]
( -0.006 0.338 ) ( -0.045 0.335 ) ( -0.019 0.320 )
Note: Estimated bounds on θ(1) using entropy parameters corresponding to the average change induced by omitting
the 1st, 2nd and the 3rd most important predictor in X or M (listed in Table 1). 95% confidence intervals based
on subsampling with 500 replications and subsample size
⌊
n0.7
⌋
are in parenthesis. The last column corresponds
to the change due to a different choice of the link function, namely probit instead of logit.
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Table 3: Bounds on the natural direct effect under d = 0 (point estimate: 0.325)
Importance
Missing X
Probit
1st 2nd 3rd
A1
[ 0.308 0.342 ] [ 0.295 0.356 ] [ 0.319 0.332 ] [ 0.325 0.326 )
( 0.202 0.457 ) ( 0.188 0.469 ) ( 0.213 0.447 ) ( 0.219 0.441 )
A2
[ 0.282 0.366 ] [ 0.285 0.364 ] [ 0.303 0.347 ] ] [ 0.299 0.475 ]
( 0.174 0.479 ) ( 0.177 0.477 ) ( 0.196 0.461 ) ( 0.192 0.586 )
A3
[ 0.308 0.344 ] [ 0.311 0.340 ] [ 0.312 0.340 ] [ 0.309 0.405 ]
( 0.201 0.461 ) ( 0.204 0.457 ) ( 0.205 0.456 ) ( 0.202 0.570 )
A1 + A2
[ 0.266 0.383 ] [ 0.255 0.394 ] [ 0.297 0.353 ] [ 0.121 0.475 ]
( 0.157 0.495 ) ( 0.146 0.505 ) ( 0.189 0.467 ) ( -0.011 0.586 )
A2 + A3
[ 0.265 0.384 ] [ 0.270 0.379 ] [ 0.289 0.361 ] [ 0.283 0.554 ]
( 0.155 0.499 ) ( 0.161 0.493 ) ( 0.181 0.476 ) ( 0.175 0.711 )
A1 + A3
[ 0.311 0.339 ] [ 0.305 0.345 ] [ 0.317 0.333 ] [ 0.311 0.338 ]
( 0.205 0.453 ) ( 0.198 0.457 ) ( 0.211 0.448 ) ( 0.204 0.453 )
A1 + A2 + A3
[ 0.248 0.401 ] [ 0.240 0.409 ] [ 0.283 0.368 ] [ 0.055 0.554 ]
( 0.138 0.514 ) ( 0.130 0.521 ) ( 0.175 0.482 ) ( -0.080 0.698 )
Importance
Missing M
1st 2nd 3rd
A2
[ 0.121 0.366 ] [ 0.142 0.364 ] [ 0.203 0.347 ]
( -0.011 0.479 ) ( 0.014 0.477 ) ( 0.085 0.461 )
A3
[ 0.261 0.344 ] [ 0.278 0.340 ] [ 0.293 0.340 ]
( 0.152 0.461 ) ( 0.167 0.457 ) ( 0.185 0.456 )
A2 + A3
[ 0.055 0.384 ] [ 0.094 0.379 ] [ 0.171 0.361 ]
( -0.079 0.499 ) ( -0.036 0.493 ) ( 0.050 0.476 )
Note: Estimated bounds on θ(0) using entropy parameters corresponding to the average change induced by omitting
the 1st, 2nd and the 3rd most important predictor in X or M (listed in Table 1). 95% confidence intervals based
on subsampling with 500 replications and subsample size
⌊
n0.7
⌋
are in parenthesis. The last column corresponds
to the change due to a different choice of the link function, namely probit instead of logit.
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Table 4: Bounds on the natural indirect effect under d = 1 (point estimate: 0.053)
Importance
Missing X
Probit
1st 2nd 3rd
A1
[ 0.035 0.071 ] [ 0.021 0.085 ] [ 0.045 0.061 ] [ 0.053 0.053 )
( -0.067 0.145 ) ( -0.081 0.159 ) ( -0.057 0.135 ) ( -0.049 0.127 )
A2
[ 0.012 0.096 ] [ 0.015 0.093 ] [ 0.031 0.075 ] [ 0.028 0.257 ]
( -0.084 0.172 ) ( -0.082 0.170 ) ( -0.068 0.150 ) ( -0.071 0.353 )
A3
[ 0.044 0.062 ] [ 0.045 0.060 ] [ 0.046 0.060 ] [ 0.043 0.076 ]
( -0.059 0.137 ) ( -0.058 0.136 ) ( -0.057 0.135 ) ( -0.060 0.154 )
A1 + A2
[ -0.006 0.113 ] [ -0.018 0.124 ] [ 0.023 0.083 ] [ -0.097 0.257 ]
( -0.102 0.190 ) ( -0.113 0.201 ) ( -0.076 0.158 ) ( -0.183 0.353 )
A2 + A3
[ 0.003 0.105 ] [ 0.007 0.101 ] [ 0.024 0.082 ] [ 0.018 0.282 ]
( -0.093 0.183 ) ( -0.089 0.178 ) ( -0.075 0.159 ) ( -0.081 0.380 )
A1 + A3
[ 0.039 0.067 ] [ 0.033 0.073 ] [ 0.045 0.061 ] [ 0.040 0.067 ]
( -0.063 0.142 ) ( -0.069 0.148 ) ( -0.057 0.136 ) ( -0.064 0.143 )
A1 + A2 + A3
[ -0.015 0.123 ] [ -0.025 0.132 ] [ 0.016 0.090 ] [ -0.120 0.282 ]
( -0.110 0.200 ) ( -0.120 0.210 ) ( -0.083 0.167 ) ( -0.205 0.380 )
Importance
Missing M
1st 2nd 3rd
A2
[ -0.097 0.096 ] [ -0.087 0.093 ] [ -0.051 0.075 ]
( -0.183 0.172 ) ( -0.174 0.170 ) ( -0.142 0.150 )
A3
[ 0.029 0.062 ] [ 0.032 0.060 ] [ 0.032 0.060 ]
( -0.076 0.137 ) ( -0.073 0.136 ) ( -0.072 0.135 )
A2 + A3
[ -0.120 0.105 ] [ -0.108 0.101 ] [ -0.071 0.082 ]
( -0.205 0.183 ) ( -0.194 0.178 ) ( -0.162 0.159 )
Note: Estimated bounds on δ(1) using entropy parameters corresponding to the average change induced by omitting
the 1st, 2nd and the 3rd most important predictor in X or M (listed in Table 1). 95% confidence intervals based
on subsampling with 500 replications and subsample size
⌊
n0.7
⌋
are in parenthesis. The last column corresponds
to the change due to a different choice of the link function, namely probit instead of logit.
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Table 5: Bounds on the natural indirect effect under d = 0 (point estimate: 0.177)
Importance
Missing X
Probit
1st 2nd 3rd
A1
[ 0.169 0.186 ] [ 0.163 0.192 ] [ 0.175 0.180 ] [ 0.177 0.178 )
( 0.063 0.272 ) ( 0.056 0.279 ) ( 0.068 0.267 ) ( 0.071 0.264 )
A2
[ 0.141 0.213 ] [ 0.143 0.212 ] [ 0.158 0.197 ] [ 0.153 0.264 ]
( 0.039 0.299 ) ( 0.041 0.297 ) ( 0.055 0.283 ) ( 0.051 0.348 )
A3
[ 0.158 0.197 ] [ 0.162 0.194 ] [ 0.163 0.193 ] [ 0.161 0.272 ]
( 0.050 0.286 ) ( 0.054 0.282 ) ( 0.055 0.281 ) ( 0.053 0.396 )
A1 + A2
[ 0.133 0.222 ] [ 0.128 0.227 ] [ 0.155 0.200 ] [ 0.087 0.264 ]
( 0.031 0.307 ) ( 0.026 0.313 ) ( 0.052 0.286 ) ( -0.011 0.348 )
A2 + A3
[ 0.122 0.233 ] [ 0.127 0.228 ] [ 0.143 0.213 ] [ 0.137 0.359 ]
( 0.020 0.322 ) ( 0.025 0.316 ) ( 0.039 0.301 ) ( 0.034 0.480 )
A1 + A3
[ 0.173 0.182 ] [ 0.173 0.181 ] [ 0.174 0.181 ] [ 0.165 0.190 ]
( 0.066 0.269 ) ( 0.067 0.268 ) ( 0.067 0.268 ) ( 0.054 0.275 )
A1 + A2 + A3
[ 0.114 0.241 ] [ 0.112 0.242 ] [ 0.140 0.215 ] [ 0.005 0.359 ]
( 0.012 0.330 ) ( 0.010 0.331 ) ( 0.036 0.303 ) ( -0.096 0.477 )
Importance
Missing M
1st 2nd 3rd
A2
[ 0.087 0.213 ] [ 0.035 0.212 ] [ 0.052 0.197 ]
( -0.011 0.299 ) ( -0.071 0.297 ) ( -0.044 0.283 )
A3
[ 0.096 0.197 ] [ 0.122 0.194 ] [ 0.146 0.193 ]
( -0.008 0.286 ) ( 0.011 0.282 ) ( 0.037 0.281 )
A2 + A3
[ 0.005 0.233 ] [ -0.021 0.228 ] [ 0.021 0.213 ]
( -0.090 0.322 ) ( -0.125 0.316 ) ( -0.077 0.301 )
Note: Estimated bounds on δ(0) using entropy parameters corresponding to the average change induced by omitting
the 1st, 2nd and the 3rd most important predictor in X or M (listed in Table 1). 95% confidence intervals based
on subsampling with 500 replications and subsample size
⌊
n0.7
⌋
are in parenthesis. The last column corresponds
to the change due to a different choice of the link function, namely probit instead of logit.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposed a sensitivity check for estimating natural direct and indirect effects in the
presence of treatment and mediator endogeneity as well as selective attrition or missingness in
outcomes. To this end, we considered identification based on inverse probability weighting using
treatment and selection propensity scores and perturbed the respective propensity scores by an
entropy parameter reflecting a specific amount of misspecification to set-identify the effects of
interest. We demonstrated that this approach can be framed as a linear programming problem
and discussed sensible choices of the entropy parameters based on the predictive power of the most
important predictors in the propensity scores. Finally, we applied our method to data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 to derive bounds on the explained and unexplained
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components of a gender wage gap decomposition that is likely prone to non-ignorable mediator
selection and sample selection in terms of the observability of the wage outcomes.
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Appendices
A Deriving bounds based on linear programming
A.1 Optimization problems for bounds on mean potential outcomes
For i = 1, . . . , n, K ∈ {1, 2, 3} and for a particular relaxation type R ∈ {X1, X2, X3,M1,M2,M3, probit} we
denote
• ωAKi = 1/qAKi
• ω¯AKi = 1/(1− qAKi ),
• ǫAKi,R =
|pˆAKi,R −pˆ
AK
i |√
pˆAK
i
(1−pˆAK
i
)
• ǫAK,1R =
∑n
i=1
Di·Si·ǫ
AK
i,R∑
n
i=1
Di·Si
• ǫAK,0R =
∑n
i=1
(1−Di)·Si·ǫ
AK
i,R∑
n
i=1
(1−Di)·Si
A.2 Bounds on Eˆ[Y (1,M(1))]
min /max
ωA1,ωA3
1
c11
·
n∑
i=1
Yi ·Di · Si · ωA1i · ωA3i
s.t.
n∑
i=1
Di · Si · ωA1i =
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i=1
Di · Si
pˆA1i
,
n∑
i=1
Di · Si · ωA3i =
n∑
i=1
Di · Si
pˆA3i
,
n∑
i=1
Di · Si · ωA1i · ωA3i =
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i=1
Di
pˆA1i
Si
pˆA3i
= c11,
∀i : ωA1i ≤ 1/
(
pˆA1i − ǫA1,1R
√
pˆA1i (1− pˆA1i )
)
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(
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√
pˆA1i (1− pˆA1i )
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R
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ωA1i ≥ 0,
ωA3i ≥ 0.
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A.3 Bounds on Eˆ[Y (0,M(0))]
min /max
ωA1,ωA3
1
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·
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A.4 Bounds on Eˆ[Y (1,M(0))]
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A.5 Bounds on Eˆ[Y (0,M(1))]
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B Descriptive statistics of the application
Table 6: Summary statistics and mean differences by gender
Variables Male(D = 1) Female(D = 0) Difference p-value
Outcome Y (non-logged, refers to selected population with S = 1)
Hourly wage 19.370 14.164 5.206 0.000
Mediators M (refer to 1998 unless otherwise is stated)
Married 0.566 0.568 -0.002 0.882
Years married total since 1979 6.430 7.537 -1.107 0.000
Northeastern region 0.153 0.155 -0.002 0.857
North Central region 0.242 0.237 0.005 0.602
West region 0.206 0.195 0.011 0.244
South region (ref.) 0.399 0.414 -0.015 0.205
Years lived in current region since 1979 14.839 15.246 -0.407 0.000
Resides in SMSA 0.811 0.816 -0.005 0.584
Years lived in SMSA since 1979 13.488 14.201 -0.713 0.000
Less than high school (ref.) 0.129 0.101 0.028 0.000
High school graduate 0.459 0.416 0.043 0.000
Some college 0.208 0.271 -0.063 0.000
College or more 0.204 0.213 -0.009 0.413
First job before 1975 0.065 0.046 0.019 0.001
First job in 1976–79 0.115 0.128 -0.013 0.083
First job after 1979 (ref.) 0.821 0.825 -0.004 0.623
Numer of jobs ever had 10.555 9.239 1.316 0.000
Tenure with current employer (wks.) 276.056 212.662 63.394 0.000
Industry: Primary sector 0.227 0.078 0.149 0.000
Industry: Manufacturing (ref.) 0.140 0.053 0.087 0.000
Industry: Transport 0.115 0.048 0.067 0.000
Industry: Trade 0.134 0.142 -0.008 0.322
Industry: Finance 0.040 0.064 -0.024 0.000
Industry: Services (business, personnel, and entertain.) 0.121 0.124 -0.003 0.768
Industry: Professional services 0.113 0.297 -0.184 0.000
Industry: Public administration 0.054 0.052 0.002 0.751
Years worked in current industry since 1982 3.555 2.622 0.933 0.000
Manager 0.234 0.258 -0.024 0.022
Technical occupation (ref.) 0.039 0.038 0.001 0.907
Occupation in sales 0.067 0.082 -0.015 0.021
Clerical occupation 0.056 0.212 -0.156 0.000
Occupation in service 0.102 0.163 -0.061 0.000
Farmer or laborer 0.276 0.042 0.234 0.000
Operator (machines, transport) 0.170 0.063 0.107 0.000
Years worked in current occupation since 1982 2.180 1.727 0.453 0.000
Employment status: employed 0.877 0.748 0.129 0.000
Number of years employed status since 1979 13.204 11.271 1.933 0.000
Employed full time 0.846 0.599 0.247 0.000
Share of full-time employment 1994-98 0.896 0.658 0.238 0.000
Total number of weeks worked since 1979 661.794 560.408 101.386 0.000
Total number of weeks unemployed since 1979 62.343 49.744 12.599 0.000
Total number of weeks out of labor force since 1979 146.118 265.276 -119.158 0.000
Bad health prevents from working 0.045 0.055 -0.010 0.071
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
Variables Male(D = 1) Female(D = 0) Difference p-value
Years not working due to bad health since 1979 0.326 0.557 -0.231 0.000
Pre-treatment covariates X
Hispanic (ref.) 0.193 0.186 0.007 0.488
Black 0.287 0.297 -0.010 0.413
White 0.520 0.517 0.003 0.840
Born in the U.S. 0.935 0.939 -0.004 0.544
No religion 0.045 0.034 0.011 0.031
Protestant 0.501 0.500 0.001 0.957
Catholic (ref.) 0.352 0.352 0.000 0.967
Other religion 0.096 0.112 -0.016 0.036
Mother born in U.S. 0.884 0.896 -0.012 0.102
Mothers educ. <high school (ref.) 0.376 0.421 -0.045 0.000
Mothers educ. high school graduate 0.393 0.369 0.024 0.048
Mothers educ. some college 0.094 0.091 0.003 0.616
Mothers educ. college/more 0.076 0.071 0.005 0.411
Father born in U.S. 0.878 0.884 -0.006 0.410
Fathers educ. <high school (ref.) 0.351 0.366 -0.015 0.201
Fathers educ. high school graduate 0.291 0.297 -0.006 0.560
Fathers educ. some college 0.087 0.076 0.011 0.105
Fathers educ. college/more 0.131 0.117 0.014 0.085
Order of birth 3.195 3.259 -0.064 0.256
Age in 1979 17.501 17.611 -0.110 0.047
Selection indicator S
Worked 1,000 hrs or more past year 0.867 0.696 0.171 0.000
Number of observations 3,162 3,496 . .
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